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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
BRIEF OF i APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
ALLEN F. RICE, Case No. 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 'THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offenses 
of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a misdemeanor, 
and Unlawful Possession :>f a Contro 1 ] ed Substance with Intent 
to Distribute for Value, a felony, both in violation ~f Title 
58, Chapter 37, Section 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
and Driving on Suspensioi i, a misdemeanor, i i vIo 1 at ioi i of Ti 11e 
41, Chapter 12, Section 32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
in the First Judicial District Court, i i I and. for Cache County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Venoy Christophersoii, Judge presid-
ing. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant, Allen P1. Rice, was charged by Information 
with the offenses of nlawfu! Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, a felony, Unlawful 
Possess ion of a Cc >n tiro J 1 eel Si lbs tance , a misdemeanor- . b th in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-3 f!QC^ a amended) 
and Driving on Suspension, : misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Anno t a te• :i, § 41 ] 2 3 9 5 3 a s amei id ed ) » I ! ie ca s e was 
tried to a jury, on April 16, 17, 18 and 19, 1985. Appellant 
was convicted of all the offenses, as charged in the Information. 
On May 6, 1985, appellant was ordered to serve an indeterminate 
sentence of not more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison for the felony conviction and serve 30 days in jail for 
the offense of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance 
and pay a $150 fine for the offense of Driving on Suspension. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order from this court suppressing 
certain evidence, reversing the judgments and convictions ren-
dered against him for the charges of Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance and Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, and remanding 
the case to the First District Court for a new trial. In the 
alternative, appellant seeks to have the judgment and conviction 
for the offense of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with Intent to Distribute for Value reversed and a judgment of 
acquittal ordered. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues raised in this appeal are: Whether law 
enforcement officers violated appellant's constitutional right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures by searching his 
vehicle?; and whether the evidence was sufficient to establish 
the element of the intent to distribute for value in the offense 
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute for value? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant, Allen F. Rice, was the subject of an ongoing 
narcotics investigation instituted by Cache County Sheriff's de-
tectives. (Tr. at Suppression Hearing at 76)1 As a result 
of this investigation the detectives in charge of the case had 
learned that: appellant lived in Salt Lake City, his driver's 
license had been suspended for failure to prove financial 
responsibility, and he regularly visited his parents in Logan 
on Wednesdays. (Tr. P. 79, Tr. S. 6, 34, 54) On Wednesday, 
December 7, 1984, as part of this investigation, Sergeant Sid 
Groll and Detective Brad Blair were conducting surveillance in 
Logan City, near appellant's parent's home. The primary reason 
they were in that area was to see if appellant was in the Cache 
Valley. (Tr. P. 78, Tr. S. 79) 
While having a drink at a service station the detectives 
observed appellant drive by in his truck. They decided to stop 
him for the offense of driving on a suspended or revoked driver's 
license. (Tr. P. 79, Tr. S. 14) By making such a stop, the 
detectives hoped to further their investigation by meeting 
1. Transcripts of three separate proceedings have been made 
part of the record on appeal: the trial, the suppression hearing 
and the preliminary hearing. These transcripts had not been 
numbered consecutively, so for the purposes of this brief 
appellant has designated the transcripts in the following 
manner: Transcript of Preliminary Hearing: Tr. P.? Transcript 
of Suppression Hearing: Tr. S.; Transcript of trial: Tr.; 
appellant face to face* (Tr. S. 16) They also stated that 
there was a possibility that contraband may be found. (Tr. S. 
29, 80) 
The detectives, who were driving an unmarked car, 
signaled appellant to pull over. He then pulled into a parking 
lot behind a law office in Logan. (Tr. P. 81, Tr. S. 14, 48, 
Tr. 103) Appellant was informed that he was being arrested for 
driving on suspension, at which time he requested that he be 
allowed to leave the vehicle at his mother's house. (Tr.S. 31, 
56)" When that request was denied appellant then asked if he 
could lock his luggage in the cab of the truck and leave it in 
the parking lot. (Tr. S. 56) Sergeant Groll denied those 
requests and gave appellant only two options: to allow one of 
the detectives to drive the truck to the Sheriff's office, or 
to have the truck searched and towed from the parking lot. 
(Tr. P. 64, 69, Tr. S. 56, Tr. 105) The appellant opted to 
allow Sergeant Groll to drive the vehicle to the Sheriff's 
department. (Tr.P. 60, Tr.S. 31, Tr. 105) 
At the Sheriff's office the detective consulted with 
patrol officers to determine what procedure to follow in impound 
searches and to obtain the proper forms to conduct the search. 
(Tr. S. 83, Tr. 110) Sergeant Groll justified his need to 
conduct an inventory of the vehicle because he had driven the 
vehicle and did not want to be the victim of a theft claim. 
(Tr. P. 59, 85, Tr. 110) Appellant was not informed of the 
necessity of such a search until it had been completed. (Tr. 
P. 59) During the course of the inventory the detectives found 
four ounces of cocaine in a paper bag inside the truck, a vile 
containing cocaine and a canister of marijuana in a camera case 
in the truck along with assorted depressant-type pharmacutical 
drugs in a suitcase. (Tr. 112) 
At trial witnesses for the State testified that based on 
the quantity, quality and packaging of the cocaine, it appeared 
that appellant was intending to distribute it to others. (Tr. 
303-306, 332, 533-535) Defense witnesses offered testimony to 
the contrary indicating that in this case, the method of packaging 
and the location of the drugs were insignificant, and that the 
quantity was consistent with the amount that may be possessed 
by a "heavy" cocaine user. (Tr. 372-375, 471-477) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The inventory of appellant's vehicle was conducted as 
a pretext to the detectives' ongoing narcotics investigation 
and not to further any of the policies that courts have found 
to be reasonable grounds for upholding inventory searches. 
Likewise, the refusal by detectives to allow appellant to 
either leave his vehicle at the scene of the arrest or turn it 
over to a third person makes any subsequent inventory or search 
of that vehicle unreasonable. The second issue raised on appeal 
is that there was insufficient evidence presented by the state 
to establish the element of intent to distribute for value. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INVENTORY OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE VIOLAT-
ED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST 
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AS IT 
WAS A PRETEXT TO AN INVESTIGATORY SEARCH. 
FURTHERMORE, PROPER PROCEDURES WERE NOT 
FOLLOWED IN TAKING CUSTODY OF THE VEHICLE 
WHICH ALSO MADE THE SEARCH UNREASONABLE. 
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress 
evidence seized during the course of the inventory search of 
his vehicle. (R. 17) An evidentiary hearing was held and the 
motion was denied in a written opinion issued by the trial 
court. (R. 110-114) The motion was reviewed at trial and 
objections were made to the introduction of the evidence seized 
as required by State v. Leslie, 672 P.2d 79 (Ut. 1983). (Tr. 
4, 337) 
In its rulings on the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has es-
tablished two requirements that must be met before the fruits 
of a search may be used against a defendant: (1) the search 
must be reasonable; and (2) the search must be made pursuant to 
a valid warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
If there is no warrant, there are specific exceptions in which 
the Court has allowed warrantless searches to be conducted.2 
The exception relied upon by the State in this case is that of 
an inventory search of a vehicle. South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364, (1976) . 
2. This court has established the same requirements for Article 
I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah, State v. Hygh, 16 
U.A.R. 10 (Ut. 1985). 
The important aspect of all of the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that the scope 
of any warrantless search is to be limited by the policies that 
justify it. The justification that the court gave in Opperman 
for the inventory search of a vehicle were four fold: (1) to 
determine if the automobile is stolen; (2) to protect the police 
from potential danger; (3) to protect the owner's property from 
theft or vandalism; and (4) to protect the police against claims 
for lost or stolen property. In upholding the inventory in 
Opperman the Court described two prerequisites that must be 
met: First the search must be made pursuant to standardized 
procedures. Secondly, the search must not be a pretext of an 
investigatory search.3 
A 
THE INVENTORY IN THIS CASE WAS A PRETEXT TO 
AN INVESTIGATORY SEARCH. 
The threshold issue in this case is whether this 
inventory search was really a pretext to the ongoing narcotics 
investigation. In making this determination, the courts look 
to the totality of all the circumstances of the arrest and 
search. The factors that the courts have found to be important 
are: whether the arrestee was a suspect in a different offense 
or investigation; whether standard procedures were followed 
during the course of the search; and the location of the vehicle 
3. These same requirements have been placed on vehicle inven-
tories conducted under Article If Section 14 of the Constitution 
of Utah, State v. Hygh, supra. 
at the time the search was conducted.* 
In State v. Stockert, 245 NW2d 266 (N.D. 1976), the 
court found the inventory search of the defendant's vehicle, 
after an arrest for a traffic violation, was a pretext to a 
narcotics investigation. In that case, the arrest and search 
were not conducted by patrolmen but, as in this case, by narco-
tics officers. Blazak v. Eyman, 399 F.Supp. 40 (D.C. Ariz. 
1971), involved a situation where the police received an anony-
mous tip that the defendant was smoking marijuana. The officers, 
before leaving the station, received a teletyped message that 
the defendant's driver's license had been suspended. The 
defendant was arrested for driving on suspension, his car was 
searched and marijuana was found. The court rejected the 
state's claim that this was a search incident to arrest and 
found that the traffic arrest was a pretext to search the 
vehicle to further the narcotics investigation. A major factor 
in the court's decision was that the defendant was never charged 
with the alleged traffic violation. Likewise, in State v. 
Phifer, 254 S.E.2d 586 (NC 1979), the defendant was stopped for 
speeding. A second officer arrived on the scene and informed 
the first officer that the defendant was a known drug dealer. 
A warrant check was conducted and outstanding warrants for 
other traffic offenses were discovered. The court found that 
the officer's decision to request a warrant check followed by 
4. See generally, LeFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment, 1978 §7.5(e). 
Q 
his unilateral decision to impound the car, after learning that 
the defendant was a drug dealer, indicated that the inventory 
was a pretext to search the defendant's car for contraband. 
In the instant case, detective Blair testified that 
over the last four and one half years he had been a detective 
involved in follow-up investigations of criminal offenses other 
than traffic offenses. He had not been assigned to duty as a 
traffic patrolman in that period of time. (Tr.S. 4) Blair 
also stated that he and Sergeant Groll were specifically looking 
for appellant and his truck on that evening. (Tr.S. 8-9) 
He then described their reasons for stopping appellant: 
A. I had no knowledge that he'd have 
drugs and stuff with him, but I knew that 
there could have been a possibility. From 
what I'd heard there could have been a 
possibility he did have that. [Emphasis 
added] 
Q. On that very night? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it's also true, Mr. Blair, 
that this is part of the reason you pulled 
him over? 
A. Part of the reason, yes. 
(Tr.S. 17) 
As described by Sergeant Groll, the detectives had, 
for several weeks, been formulating a plan to stop appellant 
for driving on suspension as part of their narcotics inves-
tigation: 
Q. Had you on any occasion prior to 
stopping Mr. Rice discussed the option of 
stopping him for driving on suspension? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When would that have been? 
A. Probably two to four weeks prior 
to that night. 
Q. And with whom was that discussion? 
A. It was discussed with Detective 
Blair. 
Q. Was Mr. Rice a subject of inves-
tigation by the Cache County Sheriff's 
Office on December 7, at least as of that 
date? 
A. Yes, sir, he was. 
(Tr.S. 66) 
The detective admitted that other options of obtaining a search 
warrant or making a controlled narcotics buy were considered. 
(Tr.S. 67-68) However, a buy could not be made and the detective 
admitted that they lacked sufficient information to obtain a 
search warrant. (Tr.S. 68) 
With respect to the effectuation of this plan, 
Detective Blair testified: 
Q. And that night as you saw him 
drive by there was an opportunity to put 
that plan or scenario into effect; is that 
true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You expected him in town that 
night because it was his habit, as far as 
you knew, to come into town every Thursday 
night, if that was a Thursday. Wednesday? 
A. Wednesday. 
Q. Wednesday night. I'm a day behind. 
A. Yes. 
i n 
Q. You knew it was his habit to come 
into town about every Wednesday night? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr.S. 19) 
These admissions of the existence of a plan to stop 
appellant to further the narcotics investigation were also 
expressed by Detective Blair. 
Q. Are you telling this court, Mr. 
Blair, that your intention of pulling him 
over was simply to cite him for driving on 
suspension? Is that your testimony? 
A. No, it's not. 
Q. All right. You pulled him over 
for far more than that, didn't you? 
A. To meet him. 
Q. Was he a suspected drug dealer; 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You pulled him over to meet him? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr.S. 15) 
This stop was a pretext to conduct further investiga-
tion on appellant by searching his vehicle. In addition to the 
detectives' statements that they hoped to find narcotics, the 
circumstances surrounding the seizure of the vehicle corroborate 
the conclusion that the inventory search was actually a pretext 
to search for narcotics. Appellant had pulled his vehicle into 
a parking lot when the detectives signaled him to pull over. 
(Tr.P. 81, Tr.S. 14, 48, Tr. 103) After being placed under 
arrest he requested the officers either to lock the vehicle and 
leave it at the parking lot or to turn it over to his parents. 
(Tr.S. 31f 56) Sergeant Groll denied both requests. He gave 
appellant the option of having the vehicle inventoried and 
towed from the parking lot or allowing Groll to drive it to the 
Sheriff's office. (Tr.P. 64, 69. Tr.S. 56) After driving the 
vehicle to the Sheriff's office, Groll then justified the inven-
tory of the vehicle by claiming that it was necessary to protect 
himself against false claims of theft. (Tr.P. 59, 85, Tr. 110) 
Essentially, the only choice that the detectives gave appellant 
was to have his vehicle searched under the guise of an inven-
tory. 
These circumstances and admissions by the detectives 
demonstrate that the search of appellant's vehicle was not a 
legitimate exercise of the caretaking required of law officers 
after they make a traffic arrest. Rather, it was a pretext 
to search appellant's vehicle to further their narcotics inves-
tigation. This is especially obvious in light of the fact that 
the detectives had been aware of appellant's suspended license 
for several weeks but had chosen not to arrest him on previous 
occasions for that offense. Thus, the search violated the 
appellant's right against warrantless and unreasonable searches 
and seizures as provided in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and Section 14 of the Consti-
tution of Utah. Consequently, the evidence seized as a result 
of that search must be ordered to be suppressed. 
B 
THE DETECTIVES IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO FOLLOW 
THE APPELLANT'S REQUEST REGARDING THE 
DISPOSITION OF HIS VEHICLE, THUS MAKING THE 
IMPOUND IMPROPER. 
The officer's purported justification for the inven-
tory search in the instant case was to protect appellant against 
theft or loss and to protect themselves against false claims of 
theft. This has generally been referred to as the "caretaking" 
function of the inventory search* In Opperman, the vehicle in 
question had been parked on the street and had been given 
numerous parking violations. Valuables had also been left in 
plain sight in the car. The owner was neither available to dis-
pose of the car which was illegally parked nor was he present 
at the time of impound. 
The United States Supreme Court, nor this Court have 
specifically addressed the issue of how to properly dispose of 
an impounded automobile when the owner is present. In State v* 
Hygh, supra, this court held that the failure to follow depart-
mental policies regarding advising a vehicle owner of impound 
procedures taken in conjunction with other circumstances of the 
arrest and search, constituted a pretext for an investigative 
search. Before law enforcement officers may claim that there 
is a valid impound/ this court held that there must be a reason-
able and proper justification stating: 
[I]n order to support a finding that a valid 
inventory search has taken place, the court 
must first determine whether there was 
reasonable and proper justification for the 
impoundment of the vehicle. This justifica-
tion and thus lawful impoundment, can be 
had either through explicit statutory auth-
orization or by the circumstances surround-
ing the initial stop. If impoundment was 
"neither" authorized nor necessary, the 
search was unreasonable. 
Utah's statutes give a police department 
authority to impound vehicles in several 
situations. Vehicles may lawfully be 
impounded when they are used to transport 
controlled substances, U.C.A 1953f §58-37-
13; when the vehicle is improperly register-
ed or stolen, U.C.A. 1953, §41-1-115; or 
when a vehicle is abandoned, U.C.A. 1953, 
§41-116.10. No specific statutory author-
ity exists authorizing impound of a vehicle 
stopped and parked on the street after the 
driver has been arrested. Therefore, we 
must look to the circumstances surrounding 
the stop to determine whether the impound 
was reasonable. 
It is the burden of the State to establish 
the necessity for the taking and the inven-
tory of the vehicle. [Footnotes ommitted] 
16 UAR at 12. 
In Hygh the Salt Lake City Police Department had pre-
viously issued a departmental order to establish impound proce-
dures when the owner of the vehicle was present. With respect 
to inventory searches conducted when the vehicle owner is 
present, this court stated: 
[W]e are not prepared to say that a true in-
ventory search cannot be made in the presence 
of the vehicle's owner and without his 
consent. However, if the purpose of the 
search is truly only to inventory the con-
tents of the vehicle and to safeguard them 
during impoundment, an indicia that such is 
the real purpose of the search is to consult 
with the owner of the vehicle when he is 
present at the time of the impound and the 
search. [Footnote ommitted] 16 UAR at 
12-13. 
Other courts have addressed this issue and have held, 
generally, when the owner of the vehicle is available to make 
arrangements for the care and custody of his vehicle after an 
arrest for a traffic offense an impoundment and inventory of 
the vehicle is not appropriate. In State v. Bales, 15 Wash. 
1 A 
App. 834, 552 P.2d 688 (1976), the court specifically held that 
following an arrest on a traffic charge, impoundment of the 
vehicle is inappropriate when reasonable alternatives exist. 
In that case the defendant had requested that the arresting 
officers call a friend to pick up the car, but they did not do 
so. Likewise, in Arrington v. United States, 382 A.2d 14 (D.C. 
App. 1978), the defendant was stopped next to a parked car and 
was directed to move his car around the corner. The police 
moved the car to the police station after finding that the 
defendant's license had been suspended. The court held that 
the police are authorized to impound a vehicle only if the 
defendant consents or he is incapable of making other arrange-
ments its disposition. 
State v. LaRue, 368 So.2d 1048 (1979), involved a 
situation wherein the defendant was arrested for driving under 
the influence. At the scene of the arrest, his automobile was 
searched. Among the factors that the court found that indicated 
that this was not a proper inventory was the fact that the 
defendant was not asked if there were valuables in the vehicle 
or if he could make arrangements to have someone pick up the 
vehicle. Finally, in United States v. Pappas, 735 F.2d 1232 
(10th Cir. 1984), officers for the Price City, Utah, police 
department responded to a complaint of an assault with a firearm. 
The officers stopped the defendant and made a limited search of 
his vehicle in a private parking lot. A firearm was located. 
The defendant was placed under arrest and his vehicle was 
impounded. During an impound search a sawed-off shotgun was 
1 C 
found. The trial court held that the impound and subsequent 
search of the defendant's vehicle violated his rights under the 
Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the defendant should have 
been given the opportunity to make other arrangements for the 
care and custody of the vehicle. The court stated: 
The trial court correctly held that Opperman 
cannot be used to justify the automatic 
inventory of every car upon the arrest of 
its owner. The justifications for the rule 
are too carefully crafted for this to be 
the intent. 732 F.2d at 1234. 
In the instant case, Detective Blair testified that 
appellant made several different requests for the disposition 
of the vehicle. He testified: 
Q. I see. Now, were you present 
during the discussion at the scene of the 
arrest where Mr. Rice asked if he could 
just lock the vehicle and leave it there 
behind the law office in the parking lot? 
Did that discussion take place? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Okay. You heard it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in response to that question 
by Mr. Rice you or Mr. Groll instructed him 
that you couldn't leave it there and it had 
to be taken in to the police station; right? 
A. No, I don't believe that was the 
conversation. 
Q. But that it couldn't be left there? 
A. I believe Sid said, "That's not 
one of the choices." 
Q. "That's not one of the choices"? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What other choices did he give 
him? 
A. I believe he said he could have a 
wrecker come and impound it or if he'd 
like, Allen would like Sid to drive it to 
the Sheriff's Office, and Allen said, "Yes, 
you can drive it." 
Allen asked if he could leave it 
at his mother's place, and Sid said, "No, 
that's not one of the"... 
Q. "That's not one of the choices"? 
A. Yeah, choices. 
(Tr.S. 30-31) 
Although the issue in this case is slightly different 
than that in Hygh, the legal principle that governs is the same. 
In Hygh the officer failed to follow departmental procedures, 
whereas, in the instant case, appellant requested that his 
vehicle be left in the custody of his mother or at the parking 
lot where he was stopped. (Tr.S. 31, 56) The detectives later 
testified that the area may not have been a safe place to leave 
the vehicle (Tr.P. 69, Tr.S. 64), but obviously appellant was 
willing to take that risk. Appellant's parents lived in Logan 
City and appellant lived there for a number of years, (Tr.S. 6, 
53) so this is not a case where he was not aware of the circum-
stances and risks in leaving the vehicle in the lot. This is 
reinforced by the fact that his parents lived only several 
blocks away. (Tr.S. 23) It would be safe to assume that the 
vehicle would be moved from the lot within a matter of minutes. 
Here, appellant was given only alternatives which would result 
in an inventory of the vehicle. When these facts are considered 
in conjunction with all of the other facts and circumstances 
surrounding the arrest, the evidence indicates that the impound 
was neither reasonable nor necessary to protect appellant's 
property or protect the detectives from false claims of theft. 
Since the justifications for an inventory search of appellant's 
vehicle are not applicable to this case, the search cannot be 
justified as a legitimate impound. State v. Hyghf supra. The 
seizure of the contraband was made in violation of his rights 
as guaranteed in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah. Consequently, the evidence seized should 
be ordered suppressed. 
C 
THE USE OF THE EVIDENCE UNLAWFULLY SEIZED 
FROM APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICIAL, THUS REQUIR-
ING A NEW TRIAL. 
Appellant was charged in an Information with three 
counts: Count I, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with Intent to Distribute for Value; Count II, Unlawful Posses-
sion of a Controlled Substance; and Count III, Driving on 
Suspension. (R. 1) The substance that was alleged to be 
possessed in Count I was four ounces of cocaine and in Count II 
was a small container of marijuana. Both items were discovered 
in the search of the vehicle. Without these substances there 
is no evidence to support these two charges. Consequently, the 
introduction of the evidence at trial was prejudicial. The 
case should be remanded to the district court for a new trial 
with an order prohibiting the use of the evidence which was 
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illegally seized. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
THAT THE APPELLANT POSSESSED COCAINE WITH 
THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE. 
The standard by which this court reviews a criminal 
conviction to determine if the evidence is sufficient to sustain 
that conviction has been described in a number of cases. 
Recently, in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Ut. 1983) , the 
court held, 
In considering that question, we review the 
evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury. 
We reverse a jury conviction for insuffi-
cient evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or in-
herently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted. 659 P.2d at 444. 
The court then went on to note the evidence must do 
more than raise a mere speculation as to the defendant's guilt: 
...we deem it desirable to emphasize that 
notwithstanding the presumptions in favor 
of the jury's decision this Court still has 
the right to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the verdict. The fabric 
of evidence against the defendant must cover 
the gap between the presumption of innocence 
and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of 
its duty to review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the reviewing court will stretch 
the evidenctiary fabric as far as it will 
go. But this does not mean that the court 
can take a speculative leap across a remain-
ing gap in order to sustain a verdict. The 
evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, 
must be sufficient to prove the defendant 
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guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 659 P.2d 
at 444-445. 
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(a)(ii) (1953 as amended) 
makes the critical element of a felonious possession of a con-
trolled substance the intent to distribute for value. This 
intent requirement is the only element that distinguishes the 
felony possession offense from a misdemeanor, unlawful posses-
sion of a controlled substance.5 
As proof of this element, the State, in the instant 
case, introduced the cocaine itself and opinion evidence of 
three people: the arresting detective, the technical services 
officer from Logan City and a State narcotics investigator. 
Each of those three offered the opinion that the appellant's 
possession of the four ounces of cocaine was consistent with 
the amounts that would be held by a "dealer". (Tr. 221, 332, 
535) These individuals based their opinions on the quality of 
the cocaine involved,** the nature of the packaging and the 
location of the package in appellant's vehicle. (Tr. 221, 
372-375, 471-477) They had substantial disagreement about the 
actual value of the cocaine. Sergeant Groll testified that 
each package could be valued at $2,000 to $2,500 (Tr. 267) and 
the four packages together had a value of $15,000. (Tr. 270) 
He also indicated that he was never aware of this quantity 
5. The legislature has amended the penalties for unlawful 
possession of cocaine to make that offense a third degree felony. 
See Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(2)(b)(i) (1953 as amended). 
6. Kent Glanville tested the four packages to contain 86% to 
94% cocaine by weight. 
on 
being held for personal use. (Tr. 270) Agent Ron Flinders of 
the State Narcotics and Liqour Law Enforcement indicated that 
each of the four packages carried a value of $1,800 to $2,000 
each. (Tr. 525) He felt the group of four packages had a 
value of $4,000 to $5,000, as the price per unit goes up with 
smaller quantities. (Tr. 543) 
The defense introduced expert testimony which indicat-
ed that an extremely "heavy" cocaine user could consume more 
than ten grams of cocaine daily. (Tr. 376, 470) It was further 
shown that individuals who "free base"7 cocaine would consume 
even more than that.8 (Tr. 470-471) Sergeant Groll was not 
familiar with the practice of "free basing", (Tr. 235) and 
Agent Flinders felt that since "free basing" was generally done 
in the house and since appellant was arrested in his vehicle 
without "free basing" paraphelnalia he did not consider that 
type use with respect to his opinion on appellant intent. (Tr. 
548) However, both defense experts indicated that it would be 
consistent with "heavy" cocaine use to possess the amount held 
by appellant at the time of his arrest. Such people would possess 
that quantity for personal use rather than for sales. (Tr. 
379, 471) 
7. Dr. Michael DeCaria described "free basing" as a process 
where the user submits cocaine hydrochloride to a chemical 
reaction which releases the hydrochloride ion from cocaine 
hydrochloride leaving the "free base" cocaine which is then 
smoked. (Tr. 465-467) 
8. Dr. DeCaria testified that theoretically a human could 
consume up to 40 grams of cocaine per day. (Tr. 469) 
Based on this conflicting testimony/ the evidence 
introduced on appellant's intent was so inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable doubt that 
appellant committed the offense of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value. 
Consequently, the judgment and conviction for that offense must 
be reversed and the case remanded to the district court with an 
order to enter a judgment of acquittal. 
CONCLUSION 
The circumstances of appellant's arrest and the 
procedures followed in the seizure of appellant's vehicle 
indicate that the inventory of the vehicle was a pretext to 
search that vehicle to further a narcotics investigation. The 
search of the vehicle cannot be justified as a lawful impound. 
The evidence seized should therefore be suppressed and a new trial 
ordered. Due to the conflicting testimony on the issue of 
appellant's intent, the evidence was insufficient to establish 
the offense of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
with the intent to distribute for value. Thus, in the alterna-
tive, appellant respectfully requests an order requiring the 
district court to enter a judgment of acquittal. 
Dated this day of December, 1985. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
G. FRED METOS 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed/deliverd to the 
Attorney General's Office, at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84114, on this day of December, 1985. 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance 
of warrant] . The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 (as amended) 
41-1-115, Seizure of vehicles stolen, improperly 
registered. The department or any peace officer, without a 
warrant, may seize and take possession of any vehicle which is 
being operated with improper registration, or which the depart-
ment or the peace officer has reason to believe has been stolen, 
or on which any motor number, manufacturer's number or identi-
fication mark has been defaced, altered or obliterated. Any 
peace officer so seizing or taking possession of such vehicle 
shall immediately notify the department of such action and 
shall hold the vehicle until notified by the department as to 
what further action should be taken regarding the disposition 
of the vehicle. 
ADDENDUM continued 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 (as amended) 
41-12-32, Crimes and penalties . Failure to report 
accident . False reports . Forged or unauthorized evidence or 
proof of financial responsibility . Driving after suspension or 
revocation of license or registration, or nonresident1s operat-
ing privilege* 
(c) Any person whose license or registration or 
nonresident's operating privilege has been suspended or revoked 
under this act and who, during such suspension or revocation 
drives any motor vehicle upon any highway or knowingly permits 
any motor vehicle owned by such person to be operated by another 
upon any highway, except as permitted under this act, shall be 
fined not more than $299 or imprisoned not exceeding six months, 
or both. 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is 
unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
* * * 
(ii) to distribute for value or possess with intent 
to distribute for value a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
* • • 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (l)(a) with 
respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedules I or II 
is, upon conviction, guilty of a second degree felony and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction of any provision of Subsection 
(l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was obtained 
pursuant to a valid prescription or order or directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this subsection; 
* * • 
ADDENDUM continued 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 (as amended) 
58-37-8 continued 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with 
respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I and II, 
or marihuana, is, upon conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony, except that if the amount of marihuana is over one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, that person is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor. Upon a second or subsequent conviction of 
possession of any controlled substance by a person having 
previously been convicted pursuant to the provisions of this 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), that person shall be sentenced to one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2)(b) 
(i); 
(ii) all other controlled substances not included 
in Subsection (2)(b)(i), including less than one ounce of 
marihuana is, upon conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
and upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor, or upon a third or subsequent conviction 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture - Seizure -
Procedure. 
(1) The following shall be subject to forfeiture and 
no property right shall exist in them: 
* * * 
(e) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles or 
vessels used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner 
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or 
concealment of property described in (l)(a) or (l)(b) of this 
section, except that: 
(i) No conveyance used by any person as a common 
carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier 
shall be forfeited under this section unless it appears that 
the owner or other person in charge of the conveyance was a 
consenting party or privy to violation of this act; and 
(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited under this 
section by reason of any act or omission established by the 
owner to have been committed or omitted without his knowledge 
or consent; and 
ADDENDUM continued 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 (as amended) 
58-37-13 continued 
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a 
bona fide security interest shall be subject to the interest of 
the secured party upon the party's showing he could not have 
known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation 
would take place in the use of the conveyance. 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
ALLEN F. RICE, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Criminal No. 3057 
The defendant has filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence 
obtained in an inventory search of an automobile and seeks to 
suppress on the basis this was a pretext search only. 
The defendant has filed also a motion for release of property 
namely a pistol and $2400.00 in case. Also a motion to discover 
and inspect. Since there was no opposition response filed to 
this Motion it will be granted and the order signed. 
It is not denied that the defendant was the subject of an 
ongoing investigation in regard to the sale of controlled substances 
and at the time of this instance was observed by the officers 
driving a pickup truck. The officers had prior knowledge the 
defendant's drivers license was suspended and arrested him for 
driving on suspension. The defendant had pulled off into a 
deserted parking lot at night with very little lighting, as all 
business at that location had closed. 
The defendant expressed concern for some property he had in 
the back of this truck in the form of boxes or suitcases and asked 
they be locked in the cab. 
The officers then made the decision the car should be impounded 
Mumboi 
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as it was in a high risk location with property of the defendant 
to be protected. There was discussions as to whether the car 
should be towed to the police station or taken to the defendant's 
parents place, about an equal distance as the police station. The 
officers told the defendant they would not take the truck to his 
parents or allow him to drive the car as this would allow him to 
commit another crime since he was on suspension. 
The result was that the defendant elected to let one of the 
officers drive his truck to the station while he rode in the 
police car with the other officer. 
Both sides cite and rely on South Dakota v. Opperman, 42 8 
U.S. 364, 49 F.2nd 1000, a 1976 case. Opperman notes their 
basis for allowing an inventory search was one: to protect the 
owners property in police custody; two: to protect the police 
against claims of lost or stolen property; three: to protect the 
police from potential danger. 
It does not appear the police were in any danger, but it does 
appear there was valuable property of the defendant to be protected 
in a high risk area, that the defendant had expressed concerns 
about this property being protected. It appears the officers 
acted reasonable to protect the defendant's property. 
Also, since the officer drives the car by himself to the 
station, the property was in his sole possession from where the 
defendant was stopped. It appears that since the defendant had 
expressed concern about his property and the car being in 
possession of the officer for this period of time, it would not 
seem unreasonable that he would request an inventory search to 
avoid accusations of missing or damaged property. 
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Defendant further urges that after a review of police 
arrests for suspension, revocation or financial responsibility 
that this defendant was picked on as far as being taken into custody. 
On the record for arrests on suspensions in the Cache County Sheriff's 
Office, on Page 8 of that report it shows that custody for such driving 
was 81% in 1982, 80% in 1983, and 91% in 1984. This would certainly 
not indicate that the defendant was an exception to being a 
custodial arrest as opposed to those just being given a ticket. 
It appears to this Court that under the facts and circumstances 
the custodial arrest as well as the inventory search was reasonable. 
The Constitution only protects the defendant from unreasonable 
searches and under the circumstances just related the Court feels 
this not to be an unreasonable search. Simply the fact that the 
defendant happened to be a person who was the subject of an ongoing 
investigation concerning drugs should not prevent the officers from 
proceeding with an arrest where the law is violated and an inventory 
search where there seems to be a valid interest in protecting the 
defendant's property as well as protecting the police interest against 
false accusations. 
Therefore, the Motion to Suppress is denied. 
As to the Motion to Release the gun and money, the Court feels 
this is a premature motion if it turns out after foundations being 
made that this is not proper evidence, the motion might then be 
a proper one, but at this point this is still a controverted fact 
situation as to whether this is appropriate evidence. 
Therefore, this motion will be denied. Counsel for State 
to prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this 3 AS (~ day of October 1984. 
« 57 KCI257 « ™E/CT , fW ML l t 2 
F, L'anny Gunnell, 16$ No, Main, Logan, Utah 84321 
Ronald J , Y e T £ i i h J . J i ^ 4 _ J q O o . U #355, SLC, UT 84111 & 
l k f 2nd(!»vof November n 8"4 
CETW ,S I I'UM ri V " * ' * < ' Gordon J . Low 
/ } T i i ^ V i J L X 175 East 1s t North 
;_ ^ U^MM^fM^- \ Logan, Utah 84321 
< *** ? 'i X.-' g£i ** * * 
\ .» "J) •">/ / 
t * - * ' 
DGUK 57 PACF258 113 
